Prompt Request Pipeline

GitHub Issue → auto-implement → PR → review → auto-merge pipeline. Write an Issue with [auto] tag, and the pipeline handles everything: task analysis, implem...

This skill will automatically clone repositories, modify code, commit, push, create PRs, review, and merge — so before installing: 1) Recognize that the SKILL.md assumes GitHub CLI auth, SSH write access, and an OpenClaw webhook token/endpoint even though the skill metadata lists no required credentials — treat those as required and only grant minimal-scoped credentials (deploy key or fine-scoped PAT) on a test repo first. 2) The message template sets allowUnsafeExternalContent=true and delivers to an external channel (telegram); avoid exposing secrets in what the agent posts and restrict destination channels. 3) The instructions say 'MUST execute' — prefer adding a mandatory manual-approval step (or a staging repository) to prevent unintended writes. 4) Test thoroughly in a sandbox repository with limited access and CI protections enabled (branch protection rules, required reviews) before enabling on real repos. 5) Consider removing or auditing any references that let the agent read other skills/agent files if those repositories may contain secrets. If you want, provide the maintainer contact or a provenance/source URL — lack of a homepage/source reduces transparency and increases risk.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: prompt-request Version: 1.0.0 This skill bundle is highly suspicious due to multiple severe vulnerabilities that enable remote code execution (RCE) and data exfiltration. The `openclaw.json` configuration (referenced in `SKILL.md` and `examples/sample-hook-config.json`) explicitly sets `allowUnsafeExternalContent: true`, which significantly lowers security barriers. The `templates/messageTemplate.txt` contains direct `exec()` calls with interpolated user-controlled variables (e.g., `OMEGA_BRIDGE_PATH`, `{{issue.number}}`), creating shell injection and RCE risks. Furthermore, the agent is instructed to read and follow external markdown files (e.g., `AGENTS.md`, `SOUL.md`, `SKILL.md`) from the repository itself, and to 'implement each meaningful task' from the issue body, providing extensive prompt injection surfaces. The agent is also instructed to 'Run existing tests' and automatically merge PRs based on its own review, which can be bypassed by a malicious actor to introduce and merge harmful code.