Multi User Workspace

Multi-user workspace management with sandbox permissions, user profiles, and relationship networks.

This skill is internally consistent, but review a few operational details before enabling it: - Verify openclaw.json bindings and sandbox settings carefully. Docker bind mounts like "~/.openclaw/workspace/guests/bob:/workspace:rw" give the container access to the host path; ensure binds only expose the intended directories. - Limit the number of administrator-role users and audit who can be assigned the administrator Role in USER.md. - Review FRIENDS/RELATIONS files for any sensitive data before putting real user data into the workspace; those files are read by the assistant and by configured agents. - Be cautious with allowed tools in agent config (e.g., allowing "exec" or "process" permits running processes inside the sandbox). If you want stricter isolation, deny exec/process or enforce tighter sandboxing. - Ensure session keys (used to derive userId) come from a trusted source and cannot be spoofed; malformed or attacker-controlled session keys could cause misattribution. - Test the setup with non-sensitive accounts first and monitor logs to confirm access boundaries behave as expected. If you want a deeper review, provide your openclaw.json and an example of your USER.md / FRIENDS/RELATIONS files so I can point out any policy or content concerns specific to your configuration.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: multi-user-workspace Version: 1.0.0 The `SKILL.md` file contains instructions for the AI agent that introduce a significant path traversal vulnerability. Specifically, the agent is instructed to extract a `userId` from the session key and then use this `userId` directly in file paths (e.g., `FRIENDS/{userId}.md`, `RELATIONS/*{userId}*.md`). If an attacker can control the `userId` portion of the session key (e.g., via a crafted session ID like `agent:main:../../etc/passwd`), the agent would be instructed to read arbitrary files on the host system, leading to potential information disclosure.