狗蛋备份恢复技能。备份 OpenClaw 核心文件（SOUL.md, AGENTS.md, IDENTITY.md, USER.md, TOOLS.md）和记忆层（memory/）到 OneDrive，支持实时监控备份和定时备份，可从云端恢复。

This skill appears to do what it claims, but review and configure it carefully before use: - Verify rclone is installed and you have a OneDrive remote named exactly 'OneDrive' (or edit the scripts/ONEDRIVE variable). The registry metadata failing to declare these binaries is an inconsistency — don't assume they exist. - Because the backups contain sensitive core files (IDENTITY.md, USER.md, etc.), use rclone's crypt remote or other encryption to protect backups in OneDrive and ensure the OneDrive account is secured (strong auth, MFA). - The scripts use hard-coded paths under /root/.openclaw. Run them as the intended user or update the paths to your environment to avoid accidental writes as root. - The restore script has fairly permissive copy logic (cp -n, cp -rn) and extracts archives to a temporary dir; run --dry-run first and inspect the contents before permitting restores. Consider testing restore on an isolated environment. - Consider running the monitor as a managed service (systemd) instead of nohup so it restarts reliably and runs under a non-root user with least privilege. - If you need the registry to reflect the skill accurately, ask the publisher to add declared required binaries (rclone, inotify-tools, tar) to the metadata and to document OneDrive setup requirements. If you want, I can point out exact lines to change (paths, ONEDRIVE name), suggest a minimal systemd unit, or show how to enable rclone crypt before enabling automatic backups.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: clawdog-backup Version: 1.0.1 The OpenClaw skill provides legitimate backup and restore functionality for core OpenClaw files and memory to OneDrive. However, the `scripts/restore.sh` script is vulnerable to a path traversal/tarbomb attack. When restoring from a user-specified local source (`--source`), the `tar -xzf` command extracts the archive to a temporary directory. A malicious archive could contain paths designed to write files outside this temporary directory during extraction, potentially leading to arbitrary file writes on the system. While the `cp -n` commands mitigate the final copy step, the initial extraction itself poses a risk.