用来帮你写周报把图文周报变成漂亮图片的skill--当前版本是苹果的风格

周报助手 — 将用户的工作内容、周报、日报、总结一键生成一张 4:3 极简科技风汇报卡片（单张图，非多页PPT）。触发词：周报助手、周报卡片、日报卡片、一张图、汇报卡、生成卡片。

This skill appears to do what it says (generate a single 4:3 card image), but there are some missing details you should confirm before using it: - Confirm the platform/tooling: the SKILL.md expects a headless Chrome/Chromium (example macOS path shown) or puppeteer to take screenshots. The skill metadata does not declare this dependency. If you don't have Chrome/Chromium or puppeteer, the automatic screenshot step will fail; ask the author to declare required binaries or provide an alternative. - File writes: the skill saves HTML under ~/.openclaw/workspace/. If you care where files land, make sure you can change that path or inspect the saved HTML before screenshots are taken. - Network access: the generated HTML loads Tailwind and Google Fonts from CDNs (the SKILL.md even suggests mirrors). That means the skill will cause your environment to make outbound requests for styling assets; if you need offline or private rendering, request local assets or an option to inline styles. - Image inclusion: the instructions require including any user-sent images unmodified. Be cautious about including sensitive images; the skill will embed them into the card and potentially upload them if you later share the output. If you plan to enable this skill: ask the author to add an explicit dependency list (Chrome/Chromium or puppeteer), make the output path configurable, and document exactly where input content/images are read from. If you cannot get those assurances, consider running the skill in a sandboxed environment or only using it with non-sensitive inputs.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: weekly-newspaper-assistant Version: 1.0.0 The skill 'weekly-newspaper-assistant' generates report cards by writing HTML files to the local filesystem (~/.openclaw/workspace/) and executing a shell command to run Google Chrome in headless mode for screenshotting (SKILL.md). While these actions are aligned with the stated purpose, the use of shell execution and direct filesystem access are high-risk capabilities that could be leveraged if the agent is not properly sandboxed. No evidence of malicious intent, data exfiltration, or unauthorized remote control was found.