Wechat Search

Search WeChat Official Account articles using OpenClaw's web search, Tavily API, and web fetch capabilities with compliance-focused design.

This skill contains mismatches and runtime assumptions you should verify before installing. Specific concerns: - The code expects a TAVILY_API_KEY (and falls back to ~/.openclaw/tavily-config.json) but the skill metadata does not declare this required credential — if you enable the skill and set that env var it will be used by subprocesses. Only provide secrets you trust the skill to use and declare. - The Python code invokes external binaries (node and the OpenClaw CLI) via subprocess; ensure those binaries exist and are the versions you expect. If you don't run node or OpenClaw in the environment, the skill may fail or behave unexpectedly. - The code executes a Node.js script via an absolute path in /root/.openclaw/workspace/skills/... — that means the skill will run code from other skill workspaces. Before enabling, inspect the referenced script (search.mjs) and any other code under that path to ensure it is safe and hasn't been tampered with. - Because the skill spawns subprocesses, it can pass environment variables to child processes. Avoid installing it in environments containing sensitive credentials unless you audited the invoked scripts. Recommended actions: - Ask the publisher to update the registry metadata and SKILL.md to explicitly declare required env vars (TAVILY_API_KEY), required binaries (node, openclaw), and any expected config file paths. - Inspect the referenced Node script (/root/.openclaw/workspace/skills/tavily-search/scripts/search.mjs) and confirm its provenance before allowing the skill to run it. - If possible, run the skill in a sandboxed environment (container) without access to sensitive environment variables or host files until you are comfortable. - If you cannot inspect or sandbox the invoked Node script and you need to keep your environment sealed, do not install or enable this skill. Confidence: high — the mismatch between declared metadata/instructions and the actual code paths (undisclosed env var use, subprocess execution of other-skill scripts, absolute paths) is clear and material.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: wechat-search Version: 1.0.3 The skill uses `subprocess.run` in `wechat_search.py`, `wechat_search_fixed.py`, and `wechat_search_simple.py` to execute external scripts and OpenClaw tools. Specifically, it calls `node /root/.openclaw/workspace/skills/tavily-search/scripts/search.mjs` for Tavily search and `openclaw tool web_fetch` for direct web scraping. While these actions are plausibly aligned with the stated purpose of a multi-layer search strategy and arguments are passed as lists (reducing direct shell injection risk), the use of `subprocess.run` to execute arbitrary external scripts (even if internal to the OpenClaw ecosystem) represents a powerful capability that warrants a 'suspicious' classification due to its inherent risk, without clear evidence of intentional malicious behavior.