Vector-Robot

Control Anki Vector robot via wire-pod. Speak through Vector, see through its camera, move head/lift/wheels, change eye colors, trigger animations. Use when user mentions Vector robot, wants to speak through a robot, control a physical robot, or interact with wire-pod.

The skill appears to do what it says (local control of a wire-pod Vector), but take these precautions before installing or enabling the auto-start script: - Do not run the install-launchagent.sh unless you want a persistent background server. Installing it writes a plist into ~/Library/LaunchAgents and loads it immediately. - If you run the Node proxy, consider editing proxy-server.js to bind only to localhost (e.g., server.listen(PORT, '127.0.0.1')) and remove or restrict CORS (avoid Access-Control-Allow-Origin: '*') so it is not reachable from the network/LAN. - The proxy writes request.json and expects a response.json in the same directory; these files contain incoming questions and answers and may be readable by other users on the system — restrict file permissions or run in a dedicated directory. - The behavior-control endpoints disable safety checks (cliff sensors) while controlled — always supervise the robot while issuing movement commands. - Only run this skill on machines and networks you control, and inspect the included scripts yourself before running. If you need higher assurance, ask the publisher for source provenance or a signed release; if the developer identity or source cannot be verified, avoid installing the LaunchAgent and run the server only interactively and bound to localhost. Reason for 'suspicious': persistence + permissive network/CORS + file-based IPC increase attack surface; the code itself is coherent and there are no obvious exfiltration calls, but these operational issues warrant caution.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: vector-robot Version: 1.0.0 The skill bundle is classified as suspicious primarily due to the `scripts/install-launchagent.sh` file, which creates a macOS LaunchAgent for persistence. This script installs `com.openclaw.vector-proxy.plist` to `~/Library/LaunchAgents/`, ensuring the `proxy-server.js` runs at startup and stays alive. While the `proxy-server.js` itself appears to be a benign local proxy for robot voice interaction (listening on localhost, writing/reading to local `request.json`/`response.json` files, and not making external network calls), the establishment of a persistent service is a high-risk capability that could be leveraged for malicious purposes if the proxied component were compromised or altered. There is no clear evidence of intentional data exfiltration, remote execution, or malicious prompt injection within the provided files, but the persistence mechanism elevates it beyond benign.