Factory

Install the full Solo Factory toolkit — 23 startup skills + solograph MCP server for code intelligence, KB search, and web search. Use when user says "instal...

This skill appears to do what it says, but it uses risky install patterns (npx, GitHub plugin installs, and a curl | sh installer) and will modify agent/server configuration to auto-start services. Before installing: 1) Inspect the referenced GitHub repo (https://github.com/fortunto2/solo-factory and solograph) and review release artifacts and install scripts; 2) Avoid piping remote scripts to sh — download, inspect, and verify signatures/checksums first; 3) Prefer cloning the repo and running installs in a disposable VM/container or sandbox; 4) Expect interactive logins or elevated permissions for clawhub/claude/mcporter and verify what accounts will be used; 5) Backup any .mcp.json or agent config files before applying changes; 6) If you cannot audit the code, treat automatic installs and auto-starting MCP services as high risk and do not run them on production machines.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: solo-factory Version: 1.1.1 The skill is classified as suspicious primarily due to the use of `curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh` in `SKILL.md` for installing the `uvx` dependency. This pattern, while common for installing legitimate tools, represents a significant remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability and supply chain risk, as it executes arbitrary code downloaded from a remote server without prior inspection. Although the stated intent is to install a legitimate tool, this method introduces a high-risk capability that could be exploited if the remote server or script were compromised, or if the author had malicious intent not immediately apparent. The `allowed-tools` also grant broad `Bash, Read, Write` permissions, which are necessary for an installer but amplify the risk of such commands.