mediaproc

Process media files (video, audio, images) via a locked-down SSH container with ffmpeg, sox, and imagemagick. Use when the user wants to transcode video, pro...

This skill appears to do what it says (run media tools inside a remote container over SSH), but there are some practical and security issues to consider before using it: - Environment mismatch: The registry metadata does not declare MEDIAPROC_HOST and MEDIAPROC_PORT, yet the script and SKILL.md require them. Expect to set these to point at a trusted mediaproc server you control. - SSH risks: The provided wrapper will automatically accept new host keys (StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new). That simplifies first-time use but increases the risk of a man-in-the-middle attack. Prefer to verify host keys manually or use known_hosts management. - Install recommendation is risky: references/setup.md suggests piping a GitHub raw install.sh into sudo bash. Do NOT run that blind. Inspect the install.sh contents locally (git clone or curl to a file and review) before running, or build/run the container yourself. - Trust the remote host: Media and file uploads are sent to the mediaproc server; a compromised or malicious server can read/exfiltrate uploaded files or execute arbitrary commands. Only point MEDIAPROC_HOST at a host you control or fully trust. - Mitigations: review the install script, run the mediaproc container locally if possible, use an ephemeral SSH key restricted to the mediaproc instance, verify host keys, and avoid using sudo piping from the web. If you need stronger assurance, ask the publisher for signed releases or source code you can audit. If the publisher updates the registry metadata to declare the required env vars and removes or documents safer install steps (no sudo curl|bash), the incoherence and install risk would be resolved and my confidence would increase.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: mediaproc Version: 2.0.1 The skill bundle contains high-risk patterns, most notably in references/setup.md, which encourages users to execute a remote script via 'curl | sudo bash', a common vector for supply chain attacks. Additionally, the SSH wrapper in scripts/mediaproc.sh passes raw, unvalidated arguments ('$*') to the remote host and uses 'StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new', which could facilitate command injection or man-in-the-middle attacks. While these represent significant security vulnerabilities, they appear to be design flaws rather than intentional malware.