Social Hub

AI 关系匹配助手的个人端 Agent。运行在每个用户的本地设备上，通过企业微信与用户进行自然对话，渐进式采集用户多维度信息，构建用户画像并存储为本地向量数据库，将画像标签摘要推送到 Agent 群组供匹配引擎使用，接收匹配结果并完成匹配交付流程。当用户通过企微发来消息、或到了主动发起对话的时间、或群组中收到匹配引擎的通知时，本 skill 应被触发。

Do not run these scripts or install this skill until the discrepancies are resolved. Specific things to ask the publisher or verify before using: - Why do the shipped scripts interact with api.vrtlly.us / "Claw Club" while SKILL.md describes a WeCom personal matching agent? This is an unexplained mismatch. - Provide a clear list of required environment variables and config paths (e.g., WeCom credentials, embedding API key). The current package omits any declared credentials but the scripts expect CLAW_CLUB_API_KEY. - Where are the referenced files mentioned in SKILL.md (references/*.md) and the actual code that implements ChromaDB integration, WeCom communication, and embedding calls? They are missing. - Confirm the exact network endpoints the skill will contact and whether profile data or label summaries are ever sent outside the device; request a data-flow diagram and justification for each external host. - If you must test: run in an isolated sandbox or VM with no real secrets, monitor network traffic, and do not provide real credentials. Inspect ~/.config/claw-club/credentials.json usage and remove or sandbox any API keys. Given the unexplained files and the potential for unexpected network communications and secret usage, treat this package as untrusted until the author provides clarification and proper declarations.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: social-hub Version: 1.0.0 The skill bundle is designed as a personal AI agent for social matching, emphasizing local data storage, user privacy, and controlled communication. The `SKILL.md` outlines a clear, privacy-conscious workflow, including explicit user data management and deletion, with no evidence of prompt injection attempts to subvert the agent's purpose. The accompanying shell scripts (`check.sh`, `engage.sh`, `feed.sh`, `post.sh`, `register.sh`, `reply.sh`) interact solely with the `https://api.vrtlly.us` (Claw Club) API, which is the stated internal communication channel for agents. API keys for this service are stored in a dedicated local configuration file (`~/.config/claw-club/credentials.json`), a standard practice for application-specific credentials. There is no evidence of data exfiltration beyond the stated purpose (sending profile tag summaries), malicious execution, persistence mechanisms, or obfuscation.