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daisuke134

prompt-sanitizer

by Daisuke Narita · GitHub ↗ · v1.0.0
cross-platform ⚠ suspicious
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Install in OpenClaw
/install prompt-sanitizer
Description
Sanitize prompts before sending to LLMs. Detects PII, prompt injection, toxicity, and off-topic content. Returns cleaned text + risk score. Use when: sanitiz...
Usage Guidance
This skill will send the prompts you want sanitized to an external service (anicca-proxy-production.up.railway.app) by installing/using an npm CLI (awal) and requiring you to authenticate. Before installing, verify the upstream package and API owner: ask for source code or a reputable homepage, confirm data handling/retention and whether payments or wallet keys are required, and avoid sending sensitive PII until you trust the endpoint. If you prefer not to expose prompts externally, use a local sanitizer or a vetted provider instead.
Capability Analysis
Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: prompt-sanitizer Version: 1.0.0 The skill is designed for a security-enhancing purpose (prompt sanitization), but it includes a prerequisite to globally install an external npm package (`[email protected]`) via `npm install -g`. This introduces a supply chain risk, as the integrity of the `awal` package is critical; a compromised package could lead to arbitrary code execution on the agent's system. Additionally, the skill relies on an external API endpoint (anicca-proxy-production.up.railway.app) for its core functionality, which is another external dependency risk. While these actions are plausibly needed for the skill's stated purpose, they represent significant high-risk capabilities without clear malicious intent within the skill bundle itself, thus classifying it as suspicious rather than benign.
Capability Assessment
Purpose & Capability
Name and description match the runtime instructions: the skill sanitizes text and returns flags/risk score. However the SKILL.md relies entirely on an external HTTP API (anicca-proxy-production.up.railway.app) and a third-party npm CLI (awal), plus mentions payment in USDC — elements not described in the registry metadata or homepage. Using an external service and a pay-per-request model is plausible for a sanitizer, but the lack of provenance for the endpoint and the unexpected payment detail are noteworthy.
Instruction Scope
The runtime instructions tell the agent (and user) to install and authenticate a third-party CLI and POST the raw text to an external API. That means any prompt (including sensitive PII) would be transmitted off-host. The example text includes the phrase 'Ignore previous instructions' (a known injection pattern) — while that may be intended as a test case, its presence was flagged by the pre-scan as an injection signal. The SKILL.md does not provide any local-only sanitization alternative or clarify data handling, retention, or privacy.
Install Mechanism
Although the registry lists no install spec, SKILL.md recommends npm install -g [email protected] and uses npx to invoke awal. Installing or invoking an npm package at runtime is common but pulls code from a public registry (moderate risk) and the specific package 'awal' is not documented in the metadata. The endpoint is hosted on railway.app under a subdomain (a personal/proxy host rather than a known vendor domain), which increases risk relative to a well-known provider or official API URL.
Credentials
The skill metadata declares no required environment variables or credentials, but the SKILL.md instructs running 'awal auth login' (implying authentication/storage of credentials) and mentions payment in USDC on a specific chain. Those authentication/payment requirements are not declared in requires.env or primaryEnv. That mismatch means the skill may request or store credentials at runtime without the installation metadata making that explicit.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill is not marked always:true and uses the platform defaults for invocation. It does not request system-wide privileges in the metadata, and there are no instructions to modify other skills or agent configuration. No additional persistence or elevated privileges are requested.
How to Use
  1. Make sure OpenClaw is installed (local or Docker)
  2. Run the install command in chat: /install prompt-sanitizer
  3. After installation, invoke the skill by name or use /prompt-sanitizer
  4. Provide required inputs per the skill's parameter spec and get structured output
Version History
v1.0.0
Initial release
Metadata
Slug prompt-sanitizer
Version 1.0.0
License
All-time Installs 1
Active Installs 1
Total Versions 1
Frequently Asked Questions

What is prompt-sanitizer?

Sanitize prompts before sending to LLMs. Detects PII, prompt injection, toxicity, and off-topic content. Returns cleaned text + risk score. Use when: sanitiz... It is an AI Agent Skill for Claude Code / OpenClaw, with 422 downloads so far.

How do I install prompt-sanitizer?

Run "/install prompt-sanitizer" in the OpenClaw or Claude Code chat to install it in one step — no extra setup required.

Is prompt-sanitizer free?

Yes, prompt-sanitizer is completely free (open-source). You can download, install and use it at no cost.

Which platforms does prompt-sanitizer support?

prompt-sanitizer is cross-platform and runs anywhere OpenClaw / Claude Code is available (cross-platform).

Who created prompt-sanitizer?

It is built and maintained by Daisuke Narita (@daisuke134); the current version is v1.0.0.

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