Placed Resume Builder

This skill should be used when the user wants to "build a resume", "create a resume", "update my resume", "export resume as PDF", "change resume template", "...

What to know and steps before installing: - Inconsistency to fix: the registry metadata says no env vars/config paths, but SKILL.md reads and writes PLACED_API_KEY and ~/.config/placed/credentials. Ask the publisher to correct metadata so the required secret and config path are explicit. - Credential persistence: the skill instructs saving your API key in plaintext as an 'export' line in ~/.config/placed/credentials. If you install/use this skill, do NOT paste a high-privilege or long-lived key unless you trust the site. Prefer creating a limited-scope or revocable API key for this purpose. - Safer alternatives: instead of allowing automatic file write, consider setting PLACED_API_KEY in your environment/session yourself or use a system keyring/secret manager. If the skill must save a file, ensure the file permissions are restrictive (chmod 600) and the directory is private. - Verify the service: confirm you trust https://placed.exidian.tech (TLS certificate, privacy policy, and account settings). The curl endpoint used is https://placed.exidian.tech/api/mcp — check network traffic or logs if you need to audit what is sent. - Minimal exposure: if you proceed, create a dedicated API key with the least privileges required and be prepared to revoke it if you stop using the skill or if you detect misuse. - Ask for clarification: request that the publisher explicitly declare requires.env: PLACED_API_KEY and required config path ~/.config/placed/credentials in the skill metadata and explain why they persist the key and whether encryption/permission guidance is provided. Overall: the skill appears to do what it says, but the undocumented handling and plaintext persistence of your API key is why this is 'suspicious' rather than 'benign.'

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: placed-resume-builder Version: 1.1.0 The skill `placed-resume-builder` contains a shell injection vulnerability in the `placed_call` function and an unsafe `source` command in `SKILL.md`. The `placed_call` function embeds unsanitized arguments directly into a `curl` command string, which could allow for arbitrary command execution. Additionally, the credential management logic uses `source` on a configuration file that is populated with user-provided input, creating another vector for command injection. While the skill's purpose of managing resumes via `https://placed.exidian.tech` appears legitimate, these high-risk vulnerabilities warrant a suspicious classification.