Ubuntu Browser Session

Use when a request needs a real Ubuntu Server browser session with durable site login reuse, bounded manual login recovery, or host-side page inspection for...

This skill appears to do what it says: managing and reusing a local Ubuntu host browser session and offering a bounded manual noVNC takeover. Before installing or giving it runtime access, consider the following: - Persistent session data: it stores profiles and manifests under ~/.agent-browser. If that directory already contains logged-in browser sessions (GitHub, Google, etc.), the skill will reuse them automatically—review or isolate those profiles if you don't want automated agent access to those accounts. - noVNC exposure: the scripts can expose noVNC URLs and have an explicit LAN mode (0.0.0.0). If you enable LAN access, anyone who can reach the host and the port may view/control the browser. Prefer the loopback URL + SSH port-forwarding, and ensure firewall rules prevent unwanted LAN exposure. - Sensitive page content: CDP snapshot/eval tools read structured page content (DOM, links, text). Treat the skill as having full read access to any page loaded in the browser (including possibly secrets visible in the DOM). Use dedicated test accounts or an isolated VM if handling sensitive logins. - Audit and harden: inspect ~/.agent-browser after use, consider running the skill in a disposable VM/container, and ensure only trusted agents are allowed to invoke it autonomously. If you want stricter behavior, modify the scripts to refuse LAN binding, require explicit user confirmation before reusing a stored session, or store profiles in a device-encrypted location. Overall, the skill is coherent with its purpose but carries expected privacy/availability risks (persistent local sessions and optional LAN VNC exposure) that you should manage before enabling it in a production environment.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: ubuntu-browser-session Version: 1.0.3 The skill bundle implements a persistent browser automation framework using Chrome, Xvfb, and noVNC. It is classified as suspicious because scripts/assisted-session.sh and scripts/browser-runtime.sh configure x11vnc with the '-nopw' (no password) flag and bind websockify to '0.0.0.0', effectively exposing an unauthenticated remote GUI session to the network. While this is documented as a 'manual login recovery' feature, the implementation lacks any authentication or encryption for the VNC/noVNC streams, creating a significant risk of unauthorized remote access and session hijacking if the host firewall is not strictly configured.