Vault Client

Hashicorp Vault client for OpenClaw agents. Read and write secrets from a Vault server without raw curl commands or hardcoded tokens. Use when reading API ke...

This skill appears to be a legitimate Vault client and is coherent with its description, but it stores tokens and cached secret values unencrypted under ~/.openclaw (vault.json and vault-cache.json) and will append a startup block to AGENTS.md during setup. Before installing: (1) ensure you trust the skill source; (2) use least-privileged or short-lived Vault tokens (AppRole or limited policies), not a root/admin token; (3) restrict file permissions on ~/.openclaw (chmod 600) and consider not enabling caching if you don't want secrets on disk; (4) keep tls.verify=true unless you must disable it for internal use; and (5) if you want higher assurance, provide the complete vault.js file (the supplied snippet was truncated) or a source checksum so the implementation can be fully audited — absence of the file tail reduces confidence.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: vault-client Version: 1.0.0 The skill is classified as suspicious due to two main reasons: 1) The `scripts/vault.js` file's `cmdSetup` function appends a block of text containing executable commands to `~/.openclaw/workspace/AGENTS.md`. While the current content is benign documentation, this capability to modify a core agent configuration file outside its own directory is a significant vulnerability that could be exploited for prompt injection or arbitrary command execution if the appended content were malicious. 2) The `vaultRequest` function allows disabling TLS certificate verification (`rejectUnauthorized: cfg.tls?.verify !== false`), which is a security weakness that could expose communications to Man-in-the-Middle attacks. There is no evidence of intentional malicious behavior like data exfiltration to unauthorized endpoints or backdoors.