SDF COM Bridge

Bridge between SDF COM chatroom and Feishu-Lark messaging platform. Supports bi-directional message translation between English and Chinese, command executio...

This skill's code largely matches a legitimate SSH-based chat bridge, but it omits important runtime details in metadata. Before installing or running it: - Review and accept that it will attempt to reuse your SSH ControlMaster socket (~/.ssh/sockets/<user>@<host>) and will spawn 'ssh' locally. Ensure you understand which SSH identity and host will be used. - Inspect and be comfortable with files created under your home (it will create ~/.openclaw/workspace with state, logs, translation-queue and results). These persist between runs and may contain chat content. - The bridge will send arbitrary COM commands and messages to the remote host (based on Feishu 'com:' inputs). Only run it if you trust the remote host and the messages the bridge might send. - The translation flow relies on a cooperating 'main agent' to process queue files; without that component translations may be stubbed. Confirm how translations are produced and who/what has access to the queue/results directories. - For safety, run and test in an isolated environment (VM/container) and use a throwaway SSH identity if possible. Verify file permissions for the created directories and clean up files after testing. - If you plan to integrate with Feishu, note the provided code parses Feishu-like commands but does not include a networked Feishu client; any network integration should be audited separately. If you want, I can list the exact files/paths the skill writes and point out the lines that create or call them so you can audit them precisely.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: sdf-com-bridge Version: 2.0.0 The skill bundle is designed to bridge the SDF COM chatroom with Feishu-Lark, supporting message relay and translation. All components, including SSH connection via `subprocess.Popen` (used securely with argument lists, not `shell=True`), COM interaction, terminal parsing, and file-based translation queues, align with this stated purpose. There is no evidence of data exfiltration, malicious execution (e.g., arbitrary shell commands, `eval`/`exec` of untrusted input), persistence mechanisms, or obfuscation. The `SKILL.md` provides clear instructions without any prompt injection attempts against the agent. File system interactions are confined to the expected OpenClaw workspace for state management and inter-process communication for translation, which is a legitimate design pattern for agent interaction.