Install, update, and monitor E.x.O. tools like jasper-recall and hopeIDS, manage OpenClaw plugins, and perform health checks with a single command.

What to consider before installing/running this skill: - Trust the source: the CLI will run global npm installs and npx commands (these pull and execute third-party code). Only proceed if you trust the E.x.O. packages and the GitHub org listed. - Missing declared requirements: the skill requires npm, npx, git and may need GitHub credentials and Telegram tokens for alerts, but these are not declared — expect to provide or have these configured in your environment. - Local file access & persistence: it reads/writes ~/.openclaw/* and checks ~/projects paths; it can create state files and may modify OpenClaw config or set cron jobs. If you want to limit impact, run it in an isolated environment or container first. - Private repo cloning: internal packages reference private repos/local paths. If you run the 'internal clone' command the skill will attempt to access your GitHub account or local project directories — verify what it will clone and where. - Inspect the code: the shipped cli.js is readable; review the remainder of the truncated code paths (cron, telegram integration, internal clone) before use. Confirm how 'auto-register with OpenClaw' is implemented and whether it modifies other skills' configs. If unsure: run the tool in a disposable VM/container, or request the maintainer to clarify required credentials (GitHub token, Telegram token), the exact changes performed on ~/.openclaw, and supply signed provenance (official GitHub repo) before granting it access to your primary environment.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: exo-installer Version: 0.4.1 The skill 'exo-installer' is classified as suspicious due to its extensive use of `child_process.execSync` in `cli.js` to install global npm packages, execute `npx` commands, and clone GitHub repositories. While the commands executed are derived from hardcoded values in `packages.json` or internal logic, and do not appear to be directly vulnerable to user-input-based shell injection in this specific bundle, the inherent power of these operations (e.g., `npm install -g`, `git clone`) represents a significant attack surface and supply chain risk. Additionally, the `cmdCronSetup` function instructs the OpenClaw agent to set up a cron job, a powerful capability, even if the suggested payload is currently benign.