x402 Paywall

x402 payment layer for AI agents — charge USDC per skill call. Meta-skill that wraps any skill with per-call pricing and on-chain payment verification.

This skill implements an on‑chain paywall and mostly aligns with that purpose, but several red flags mean you should not install it blindly: 1) SKILL.md references a PaymentClient and automatic payment behavior that is missing from the code bundle—expect to implement or supply that yourself. 2) The payment verification is incomplete: the verifier posts to an RPC and currently treats a transaction as valid on a very loose basis (and falls back to accepting any 0x...66‑char string if the requests library is absent). This can allow fake/forged tx hashes to be considered valid in some environments. 3) The package metadata declares no environment variables, but the code uses ETHEREUM_RPC_URL and examples encourage using private keys—do not paste private keys into code or logs. 4) Default RPC URL construction uses nonstandard hostnames (e.g., mainnet.base.org) which are not standard public RPC providers; you should supply and verify a trusted RPC endpoint. 5) The repo contains two different Ledger implementations (duplicate code) and several small API mismatches (e.g., decorator wrapper signatures) — test thoroughly. Recommendations before installing: review the paywall.py and ledger.py code line‑by‑line, provide a trusted RPC provider via ETHEREUM_RPC_URL, never hardcode private keys (use a vault), add robust on‑chain log decoding instead of the current receipt check, and run the skill in a sandboxed environment with testnet funds until you confirm behavior. If you need, ask the publisher why PaymentClient is referenced but not included and request explicit docs for secure key management and RPC configuration.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: x402-paywall Version: 1.0.0 The skill bundle implements a payment layer (x402) that handles sensitive cryptocurrency private keys and on-chain transactions, which is a high-risk capability. Significant security vulnerabilities exist in 'src/paywall.py', specifically in the 'PaymentVerifier.verify' method, which contains a fallback that accepts any 66-character hex string as a valid payment if the 'requests' library is missing. Furthermore, the verification logic only checks for transaction success ('0x1') without validating the recipient or the amount, allowing any successful blockchain transaction to bypass the paywall. While these appear to be critical implementation flaws rather than intentional malware, the handling of private keys combined with weak verification logic poses a substantial risk.