Matomo Analytics

Query, analyze, and manage Matomo Analytics with API integration, custom reports, and goal tracking.

This skill appears coherent and does what it says, but keep these precautions in mind before installing or using it: - Confirm the Matomo URL you provide is your own self-hosted instance; the skill will send API requests only to that URL. - Do NOT paste your token into chat. Follow the guidance to store the token in an environment variable (e.g., MATOMO_TOKEN) or the system keychain and reference it by name. - Be aware that including token_auth in a query string (the examples use ?token_auth=...) can expose the token in server logs, proxies, or shell history. Use HTTPS and prefer secure storage; if possible avoid pasting tokens into command lines that might be recorded. - Periodically inspect ~/matomo/ (memory.md, reports) to ensure no credentials were accidentally saved in plaintext. - Because this is instruction-only (no code installed), the agent and you are responsible for following the documented rules; if you need stronger guarantees, prefer a skill that includes vetted code or an installable package from a trusted source. - If you share access with others, rotate the token and limit its scope where Matomo supports that. If you want, I can list the exact places the skill will write (files and directories), or suggest safer command patterns for calling Matomo so tokens are less likely to leak.

Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: matomo Version: 1.0.1 The skill is designed for legitimate Matomo analytics integration and includes strong documentation emphasizing secure credential handling and limited data egress. However, the `SKILL.md` and `api.md` files provide `curl` command patterns that incorporate multiple user-controlled variables (e.g., `{matomo_url}`, `{method}`, `{site_id}`, `{period}`, `{date}`, `{token}`). If the OpenClaw agent executes these commands without robust input sanitization, it introduces a significant shell injection vulnerability, allowing a malicious user to potentially execute arbitrary commands on the host system. While there is no evidence of intentional malicious behavior by the skill author, this high-risk execution pattern makes the skill suspicious.